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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff Richard Ross 
to modify a California divorce decree, with a counterclaim 
by Carol Ross for judgment as to arrearages in child sup-
port and alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried by the Court, sitting without 
a jury, commencing on March 3, 1978, and continuing until 
March 17, 1978, whereon the matter was concluded. 
Subsequent to the trial, the trial court issued 
a Memorandum Decision (R. 215-216) wherein it found the 
doct.I:ines of laches, equitable estoppel, and presumably, 
release and waiver, not to apply to the case, and granted 
judgment against plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim for 
the sum of $31,151 as the amount due after deductions for 
certain amounts credited and paid by plaintiff. The Court 
also granted judgment in favor of the Utah State Department 
of Social Services in the sum of $1,544, for reimbursement 
of welfare paid to the defendant. The trial court eventually 
entered an Amended Order dated April 11, 1978, wherein, 
after making all deductions, judgment was granted against 
the plaintiff in the sum of $24,451 in favor of defendant, 
and against plaintiff in the sum of $1,544, in favor of 
the Department of Social Services. 
At the same trial, the Court modified the California 
divorce decree reducing the alimony from $150 to "O" , and 
iii 
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the child support from $100 per child to $75 per child. 
(T. 231-2) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Richard Ross, seeks reversal of the 
judgments against him in favor of both Carol Ross and the 
Department of Social Services for arrearages in child sup-
port and alimony, on the grounds of equitable estoppel, 
waiver and release. In order to economize on space, 
plaintiff has also included in this brief his argument 
which would normally be presented in the response to the 
brief of defendant Carol Ross, who is appealing the modifi-
cation of the California decree. Therefore, plaintiff seek 
also that the trial court's judgment modifying the Californ 
decree be upheld. 
iv 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties in this action were originally di-
vorced in California in February, 1971. The defendant 
herein was awarded alimony in the sum of $150 per month 
and child support in the sum of $100 per month per child 
for each of three minor children whose ages at that time 
were 6, 9 and 10. In that action, the defendant herein 
was the plaintiff. Prior to trial in this matter in Utah, 
the parties stipulated that the California divorce decree 
should be adopted by this Court. (R. 37-8) 1 
At the time of the California divorce, the 
plaintiff was employed as a mechanic and making approxi-
mately $1,000 per month. (T. 190) 2 His wife, Carol Ross, 
was awarded the California home which she sold sixteen 
months later for a $25,000 profit. (T. 215) Mr. Ross was 
not represented by counsel at that California proceeding. 
(T. 155) 
The plaintiff frankly and honestly testified that 
immediately after the California proceeding, he left the 
state of California for Dallas, Texas, where he began living 
under an assumed name (Henderson) . He candidly stated his 
reasons as wanting to avoid making the payments under the 
1The record, aside from the transcript of the trial, will 
be designated by "R.", and the numbering refers to the stamped 
number on the lower right. 
2The transcript will be designated by "T.", and the 
numbering will refer to the typed number on the upper, right 
hand side of the page. 
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divorce decree because he couldn't afford them and didn't 
want to go to jail. (T. 10, 155) He made no attempt to 
justify this action at trial. (T. 10, 155) 
Plaintiff nonetheless evinced a genuine concern 
for the welfare of the children since he called his mother, 
Mrs. Mary McKendrick, who lived near the children, immedi-
ately upon his arrival in Texas and inquired about their 
welfare. (T. 82-3, 153-4) Both the plaintiff, and his 
mother, who flew in from California, testified that in these 
conversations that occurred in the days immediately after he 
left California, plaintiff stated that he would send between 
$200 and $250 per month for the support of the children by 
means of a check to Mrs. McKendrick. Mrs. McKendrick was 
thereupon instructed to purchase clothing, food, etc. for 
the children and take it to them diretly. (T. 83-4, 12, 
153-5) 
Mrs. McKendrick affirmed that she did receive on 
the average of $200 to $225 per month and that she did spend 
the same, every dollar of it, for the welfare of the children. 
(T. 83, 85, 90) Mrs. McKendrick further indicated that a 
number of the checks came from Mr. Ross' roommate and some 
came by way of money orders because Mr. Ross had not yet 
become established in the new town. (T. 88) As further 
evidence of concern for the family, he instructed Mrs. Mc-
Kendrick to deliver to Carol an automobile for her use 
(T. 89), which she admitted receiving and using. (T. 61) 
Defendant first claimed not to have had contact 
again with the plaintiff until February, 1973 (T. 34), but 
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later admitted under cross-examination that plainti!! called 
her as early as October, 1972. (T. 59) Prior to thai;., 
carol had made efforts to locate the plaintiff by going to 
the district attorney's office in California to seek legal 
action against plaintiff. (Ex. 25, letter of 11/20/72 from 
the Department of Welfare, San Mateo County, Cal.) Mr. Zambos, 
a special investigator for the Department of Recovery Services, 
also testified that the defendant went on welfare in Salt 
Lake City in October, 1972, and that from that time, through 
approximately September, 1973, his department was looking 
for the plaintiff to enforce his support obligations. 
108) 
(T. 102-
Although Carol first claimed not to have 
heard from plaintiff or discussed child support with him, 
until February 18, 1973 (T. 34, 62), she later admitted 
that he called her in January, 1973, and told her of his 
desire to "make some arrangements for it (child support)". 
(T. 63) 
Both plaintiff and defendant testified that 
plaintiff flew to Salt Lake City in February, 1973, rented 
a car, and lived in a motel, for approximately three days, 
during which time he saw the children and the defendant on 
several occasions. (T. 65-7; 160-1) 
Beginning in March, 1973, defendant Carol Ross 
received support money directly from plaintiff by way of 
checks. (T. 35, 7 O; Ex. 13) Plaintiff could account for 
approximately $310 for a period of roughly six months. 
(Ex. 2, schedule B) The checks contained plaintiff's 
-3-
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Texas address, phone number and alias name. (Ex. 13) 
In October, 1972, defendant went on welfare in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. (T. 68) She executed an "assignment" 
which assigned to the Division of Family Services " ... all 
monies payable to me. . . from Richard Ross". (T. 68-9, 
130; Ex. 4) Despite the assignment, defendant accepted $310 
directly from Mr. Ross during the period from March through 
September, 1973 (T. 72), none of which defendant ever reported 
to welfare. (T. 73-5) 
Plaintiff testified that the parties had an 
understanding between themselves to the effect that he would 
only have to pay child support and he could forget the ali-
mony and arrearage in child support. (T. 17, 19, 159, 161, 
172) Defendant denied such an agreement or understanding. 
(T. 65-8, 62) (But see T. 136, lns. 23-5) 
At least as early as March, 1973, defendant knew 
plaintiff's exact address and the alias he was using since 
he began sending her checks with his return address on them. 
(T. 35, 70 and Exs. 13; 2, schedule B) Defendant never 
made any effort, at any time, to notify Recovery Services, 
welfare, or any other officials of plaintiff's whereabouts 
(T. 131-2), nor did she attempt to force him to pay any back 
child support during this period. (T. 134-5, 63-4, 71) 
The Divison of Recovery Services did institute 
a legal proceeding in November, 1973, in Utah against the 
plaintiff in Texas, but said proceeding was later dropped 
prior to service (apparently after the Attorney General 
-4-
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discovered the settlement) . (T. 113 and Ex. 20) Defendant 
1as totally unaware that said action was filed. (T. 130) 
The October, 1972, "assignment", wherein Carol 
transferred to the Division of Family Services all monies 
payable from the plaintiff, also authorized the compromising 
of any and all claims without further notice to herself. 
(T. 68-9, 130 and Ex. 4) 
Plaintiff himself later initiated contact with 
Recovery Services, without ever having been contacted or 
found by them, in approximately July, 1973, through a Dallas 
attorney. (T. 27-30; Exs. 17-19) Plaintiff later called 
Mr. Zambos personally and alleged to have arrived at an 
agreement whereby certain amounts would be paid every month 
and the arrearage would be compromised. 
Ex. 16) This was disputed by Mr. Zambos. 
(T. 30, 161-4 and 
(T. 115-6, 152) 
After the alleged agreement, plaintiff made 
regular payments to the Family Support Division as follows 
(T. 27-30 and Ex. 15): 
a. Two checks dated August 4, 1973, 
and September 17, 1973, for $232 each for a 
total of: 
b. Payments for the balance of 
1973 to Recovery Services by check: 
c. Checks to Recovery Services, 
$ 464.00 
$ 650.00 
1974: $2,475.00 
d. Checks to Recovery Services, 
1975: $2,700.00 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
e. Checks to Recovery Services, 
January, 1976: 
Total: 
$ 225.00 
$6,514.00 
In December, 1975, plaintiff visited Salt Lake 
City at the request of the defendant (T. 167-8, 20), and 
was at that time asked by defendant to return to Salt Lake 
City so that the children could have a father and a family. 
(T. 167-8) Plaintiff thereupon returned to Dallas, Texas, 
quit his job and incurred substantial detriment in moving 
all of his belongings to Salt Lake City. (T. 169-70) 
Plaintiff and defendant began living together 
as man and wife in January or February, 1976, although they 
did not remarry. (T. 168, 142-3) They lived together at 
the home of defendant's parents until approximately September, 
1976, at which time they purchased a house as "joint tenants, 
husband and wife". (T. 169-70, 144-5 and Exs. 32-34) 
During this period when they were together, 
the plaintiff paid substantial sums for the support of the 
children and the defendant, as well as a $5,000 downpayrnent 
on the home the parties purchased in September, 1976. 
(T. 173-6, Ex. 2, schedules C-G) Plaintiff has paid the 
house payment of approximately $365 per month every month 
beginning September, 1976, through December, 1977. (T. 144-
5) The defendant and the three children have lived in said 
house since September, 1976, and at all relevant times 
during this action. (T. 144-5) 
During all relevant times from February, 1971, 
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th" ''wJh trial, defendant was a good mother, the children 
were well cared for, and suffered absolutely no want, 
hardship or privation. (T. 55, 96) 
During the period from February, 1971, through 
the time when this legal action was filed, defendant never 
made any attempt whatsoever, or filed any claim, to collect 
alleged arrearages in child support and alimony. (T. 134-5, 
63-4, 71, 130-2) Her counterclaim in this action alleging 
the arrearages was filed after she was served with the 
process in this action, as well as a separate suit for 
quiet title to the home. (T. 182) 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL AND LACHES BOTH AP-
PLY TO BAR THE DEFENDANT HERE-
IN FROM CLAIMING ARREARAGES 
IN CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. 
THE COURT MISUNDERSTOOD AND 
MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN THIS 
REGARD; THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE 
FINDINGS MADE TO THE EFFECT 
THAT SAID DOCTRINES DO NOT 
APPLY; AND THIS HAS RESULTED 
IN SERIOUS INEQUITY AND A 
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A 
THE LAW OF THIS CASE 
Standard on Appeal 
This Court has held that divorce actions are equity 
proceedings and this Court may review the evidence and make 
its own findings. Barker v. Dunham, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P. 
2d 867 (1959); Article VIII §9, Utah Constitution. However, 
the Supreme Court will not exercise this authority as a 
general rule since the trial court has considerable discre-
tion in adjusting the financial and property interests of 
the parties. However, where the trial court has either mis-
understood or misapplied the law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings made; or a serious inequity has result~ 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will 
step in and reverse where appropriate. Hansen v. Hansen, 
537 P. 2d 491 (Utah 1975); Owen v. Owen, 579 P. 2d 911 
(Utah 1978). Plaintiff-Appellant makes all three contentions 
as grounds for reversal of the trial court's decision herein. 
-8-
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Estoppel Was Clearly Justified in This Case 
Defendant, due to explicit and/or implicit 
actions or representations, should be estopped from 
claiming or being awarded arrearages in child support and 
alimony. This Court has defined the standard in such cases: 
It is the prerogative of the trial 
ccurt to determine these facts and 
if he finds that facts exist to 
justify equitable estoppel, he should 
apply the doctrine and relieve the 
father of payment of the installments 
to the extent indicated. Larsen v. 
Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P. 2d 596 
at 598 (1956). 
The Trial Court's Findings 
The trial court specifically found in its Merner-
andum Decision (R. 215) and its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law (Findings Nos. 7, 8 and 9, and Conclusions 
of Law No. 8, R. 225-7) that the doctrines of equitable 
estoppel, laches and waiver did not apply to the 
facts of this case. The trial court thus granted judgment 
against plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim for arrear ages 
in child support and alimony in the sum of $24,457 (after 
deducting $5,000 for the downpayment on the house) as well 
as $1,544 against the plaintiff in favor of the Utah State 
Department of Social Services for welfare assistance paid 
to the defendant. ~. 229) This judgment is erroneous 
under the standards of Hansen and Owens, supra, and should be 
reversed. 
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The Standard of Larsen v. Larsen 
Utah has recognized the principle of equitable 
estoppel and related doctrines to bar a mother from collecti 
a large, cumulative debt for arrear ages in child support and 
alimony. In Larsen, the father responded to the mother's 
claim for arrearages in child support and alimony by allegin 
that the mother had refused to accept payments; that a third 
party was helping to support the child; that all the mother 
asked the father to do was refrain from seeing her and the 
child; and that the father had undertaken additional obli-
gations in reliance upon the alleged agreement with, or 
actions of, the mother. The mother admitted that she had not 
tried to collect any of the back payments over a period of 
eight years. 
The trial court ruled that equitable estoppel 
was not available as a defense for non-payment of accrued 
support for a minor child and the father appealed. 300 P. 
2d at 597. The Supreme Court reversed noting that there 
was sufficient evidence that the trial court could reasonabl: 
find laches, acquiescense, or equitable estoppel. Id. 
The Court carefully distinguished between a claim that the 
alleged agreement or actions of the mother barred her re-
covery of past or accrued amounts, as opposed to a claim 
wherein the alleged agreement or actions were used as the 
basis for seeking a modification which would be binding for 
future payments. In this conjunction, the Court held: 
-10-
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However, this does not mean that a 
mother may not by her actions or repre-
sentations, or both, preclude herself 
from recovering past-due installments 
of support money which she has spent for 
the support of the child. Where the 
father's failure to make such payments 
was induced by her representations or 
actions and where as a result of such 
representations or actions the father 
has been lulled into failing to make 
such payments and into changing his 
position which he would not have done 
but for such representations, and as a 
result of such failure to pay and change 
in his conditions, it will cause him 
great hardship and injustice if she is 
allowed to enforce the payment of such 
back installments, she may be thereby 
estopped from enforcing the payment of 
such back installments. (emphasis added) 
300 P. 2d 597. 
Justice Crockett emphasized in Baggs v. Anderson, 
528 P. 2d 141 (Utah 1974) that support money falls into 
two separate categories: 
First, the current and ongoing right 
of a child to receive support money 
from his father (parent); and second, 
the right to receive reimbursement 
for support of a child after that has 
been done. Id. at 143. 
In the second instance, an estoppel to collect 
arrearages in support may arise where this essential ele-
ment is found: some conduct on the part of the mother 
which reasonably induces the obliger to rely thereon and 
make some substantial change in his position to his detri-
ment. (emphasis added) 528 P. 2d at 143. See also Clark 
v. Chipman, 510 P. 2d 1257 (Kan. 1973) 
As to the mother's power to make representations 
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or take actions compromising arrearages in child support, 
the Court in Larsen noted: 
If the child has been the bene-
ficiary of equivalent support 
and education so that the mother is 
entitled to receive all of said past-
due support money, she should be 
free to release, compromise, or waive 
that which is hers. 300 P. 2d 597. 
The standard of equitable estoppel to collect arrearages 
in child support and alimony, as set forth in Larsen, 
was reaffirmed in several subsequent Utah cases other than 
3 Baggs. In French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P. 2d 
315 (1965) the standard of Larsen was recognized, although 
not applied. The plurality (with one concurring and two 
dissenting) felt that the facts simply showed "no repre-
sentations, either explicit or implicit" by the wife to 
the husband. Id. at 315. The facts in French stand in 
contradistinction to the facts of the case at the bar 
where explicit representations or agreements or implicit 
representations (actions and conduct) are claimed. 
Furthermore, although there was a dispute in 
this Court as to the application of the legal standard to 
the facts in French, Justice Crockett's statement in the 
dissenting opinion summarizes well the objective in this 
type of case: 
3A recent Utah case presents some superficial fact 
similarities to the case at the bar. (See Ciraulo v. 
Ciraulo, 576 P. 2d 884 (1978). However, in Ciraulo, the 
issue of equitable estoppel does not appear to have been 
raised. The main issue appears to have been substitution 
of benefits. 
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Nevertheless, it must be remembered 
that the equities are not always all 
on one side, and that each situation 
should be dealt with on its own facts 
and toward the objective which is 
fundamental to all such proceedings, 
that of best serving the welfare of 
all concerned. When viewed in that 
light, the circumstances may well be 
such as to justify the Court invoking 
its equitable power and refusing to 
enforce immediate collection of a 
large accumulated debt. 401 P. 2d 
at 317. 
See also Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P. 2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
The facts of the case at the bar compel the 
finding that the conduct of the defendant is such as to 
reasonably induce plaintiff to rely thereon and make some 
substantial change in his position. 
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B 
REPRESENTATIONS AND IMPLICIT 
AGREEMENT OR CONDUCT JUSTIFYING 
RELIANCE 
The Preponderance Of The Evidence 
Showed At Least Implicit Representations 
And Conduct By Defendant Which Compel The 
Finding Of Equitable Estoppel As To The 
Claims For Arrearages Of Both Child Support And Alimony 
It is conceded that plaintiff was wrong in 
leaving defendant with three children in California after 
the divorce. (T. 10, 155) 4 Appellant asks this Court 
simply to look at all the facts and circumstances which 
took place thereafter and which were ignored by the trial 
court. These facts point either to an implicit agreement 
or understanding based upon defendant's or her agent's 
representations or conduct, which justified plaintiff in 
taking action to his detriment, all of which form the basis 
for estoppel 
Mr. Ross' Agreement With Mrs. Ross 
Mr. Ross stated that Mrs. Ross made representation 
to him as early as October, 1972, to the effect that she 
would not consider him liable to pay the full amount under 
the divorce decree if he would simply start paying support 
for the children. (T. 15-17, 159) Mr. Ross further claimed 
4It is also noted, however, that plaintiff had no 
attorney at the California hearing at which he was ordered 
to pay $450 a month total on an income of approximately 
$1,000 per month, and in which defendant was given the 
entire equity in the family home which she later sold for 
a $25,000 profit. (T. 215) 
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to have had similar conversations in January, 1973, Febru-
~1 l97 3, summer and fall of 1973, December, 1975, January, 
1976, and at various times thereafter. (T. 19, 159, 160-1, 
164-5, 172) Regarding the October, 1972, conversation, 
Mr. Ross testified as follows: 
I don't remember the exact conversation, 
but we had talked, and I told her I 
wanted to see the kids. And she said, 
you know, she wouldn't push anything as 
long as I paid support, and it would be 
all right for me to come up there (Salt 
Lake City) and see the kids ... this is 
all she really wanted is for me to take 
care of the kids. I told her I didn't 
mind doing this. (T. 17) 
Regarding the February, 1973, conversations, Mr. Ross 
testified: 
There is no way I can remember the exact 
words. The gist of the conversation was 
I would assume responsibility for taking 
care of the kids and she wouldn't hassle 
me on alimony. (T. 161) 
Regarding conversations in July, August, and September, 
1973, the substance thereof was basically the same as the 
above two conversations. (T. 164-5) All of the relevant 
facts and actions of the defendant lend credence to the 
testimony of Mr. Ross and cast that of Mrs. Ross in doubt. 
Mrs. Ross' Inconsistent 
Testimony Regarding These Conversations 
On direct examination by her own attorney, Mrs. Ross 
was very definite about the fact that after the California 
divorce in February, 1971, she next heard from Mr. Ross 
in February, 1973. (T. 34) She further stated under 
direct examination by her own attorney the following: 
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Q: From the time of the divorce, carol, 
which is February, 1971, up through 
the period when he actually started 
living in your parents' home, which 
is January of 1976, what if anything 
was ever said about the back pay-
ments of alimony and child support 
that he had not paid during that period? 
A: Nothing. 
Q: Nothing was ever said about it? 
A: No. 
Q: There was nothing said about the back 
payments during this Christmas visit 
or at any other time? 
A: No. (T. 48) 
On another occasion, defendant Carol Ross testified as 
follows: 
Q: (Mr. Williams): In fact, you have 
already testified here today, haven't 
you, that you never did have a con-
versation about back payments with 
the plaintiff until you were living 
together (January, 1976)? Isn't that 
true? 
A: Yes. (T. 152) 
Under cross-examination, defendant had to admit 
that these statements were not correct or fully truthful. 
First, she admitted that Mr. Ross made contact with her as 
early as October, 1972, instead of February, 1973, as 
previously testified. (T. 34, 59, 62) Then, she later 
testified that she remembered yet another conversation in 
January, 1973, wherein he called her and discussed child 
support: 
Q: (Mr. Sykes): What did you talk about? 
A: He wanted to come up here and see the 
kids for a few days and make some kind 
of arrangements for child support and 
straighten his name out. That was the 
purpose of the visit. 
Q: He indicated to you a desire to pay 
child supoort and get that straightened 
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around, is that right? 
A: He wanted to make some arrangements 
for it, yes. (emphasis added) (T. 63) 
Mrs. Ross further testified that when Mr. Ross 
visited her and the children in February, 1973, the subject 
of child support and alimony came up, with the topic centering 
around how much he was going to pay. (T. 67) 
The Court definitely had a conflict in the evi-
dence before it, but this certainly should have been resolved 
in plaintiff's favor where defendant's testimony was so 
glaringly inconsistent. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely 
that Mr. Ross would come a thousand miles from Texas to dis-
cuss child support and not even broach the subject of past-
due payments. He re-established contact in at least Octo-
ber, January and February of 1972-3, and actually made a 
trip to Salt Lake City. He began paying some support money 
in March. 1973. (T. 35) It only makes sense that an 
implicit understanding was reached. 
Mrs. Ross Made No Effort To 
Report Mr. Ross To Recovery Services 
Or: To Compel Him To Pay Child Support 
If there was no understanding or agreement re-
garding past-due and future child support, as alleged by 
Mrs. Ross, then it stands to reason that she would make 
every effort to let the authorities know where Mr. Ross was 
in order to make him pay child support. On the other hand, 
if the parties did have an understanding that Mr. Ross could 
forget past-due child support and delinquent alimony, as 
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was his testimony, one would expect Mrs. Ross to take no 
such action against Mr. Ross even though she knew his where 
abouts. 
Mrs. Ross attempted to adopt the former position 
at trial by indicating that she was extremely angry with 
Mr. Ross in 1972 because of his failure to pay child sup-
port. (T. 127, 143, 152) But again, the evidence does 
not bear out defendant's truthfulness in this regard. The 
evidence clearly supports the inference that there was some 
type of understanding between the parties in accordance 
with plaintiff's testimony. 
The February, 1973 Visit 
There is no dispute about the fact that the 
plaintiff came to Salt Lake to visit the children during 
the period from February 16th through February 18th, 1973. 
(T. 63-7) She knew where he was staying and they visited 
together several times. (T. 6 5- 7) During this time she 
could have easily had him picked up or served with an 
Order to Show Cause, had she wanted. 
Never Reported Mr. Ross To Recovery Services 
It is significant to note that Mrs. Ross went 
on welfare in Salt Lake City in October, 1972. (T. 68) 
She was well aware that the "welfare people" could have 
made Mr. Ross pay something for child support. (T. 70) 
She even attempted to get the district attorney in San 
Mateo County to take some action against Mr. Ross in the 
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~arly part of 1972, prior to the time that Mr. RGss says 
lhej came to an understanding. (Ex. 25, letter of 11/20/72; 
T. 130) 
She further admitted that ahe knew that Recovery 
Services was looking for Mr. Ross after she went on wel-
fare. (T. 131-2) 
Her story is all the more unbelievable after 
March, 1973, because at that time, she began receiving 
checks from Mr. Ross, who was living in Texas under his 
alias name. (T. 132, Ex. 13 and Ex. 2 schedule B) The 
checks contained Mr. Ross' name, address and telephone 
number. If she wanted to turn him in, it would have 
been simple. 
Despite receiving money from Mr. Ross, she never 
discussed the matter with Recovery Services (T. 131) 
or attempted to report any of the money she received. 
(T. 73) This was so despite the fact that she knew that 
welfare prohibited "double-dipping" and required her to 
report money received from other sources. (T. 69-70) 
Furthermore, she never reported to Recovery Services 
any of her conversations of October, 1972, January 1973, 
or thereafter. (T. 63-4) 
Mr. Ted Zambos, a special investigator for 
Recovery Services, testified that it was customary to 
check with the mother from time to time about the location 
of the father when the file comes up for review every 40-60 
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days. (T. 102-105) He further indicated that he would 
have made his first contact with Mrs. Ross in approximately 
November, 1972, but his file recorded nothing regarding 
any information provided then, or subsequently, by Mrs. Ros! 
as to Mr. Ross' whereabouts. (T. 103; see all of the lette! 
in Ex. 25) Mr. Zambos' file was full of letters indicating 
attempts to discover the whereabouts of Mr. Ross through 
September, 1973, or a period of at least six months when 
Mrs. Ross without question knew his whereabouts! (T. 107-L 
All of this is highly suggestive of the fact 
that the parties had an understanding with respect to the 
payment of child support, both past and future, and Mrs. 
Ross was acting on that agreement in not reporting Mr. Ross. 
Mr. Ross' Attorney Contacts Carol Ross 
If Carol Ross had any doubt as to Mr. Ross' 
whereabouts, or the good faith of his effort to get the 
child support problem resolved, it should have been erased 
\./hen she received letters from Mr. Ross' attorney in Dallas. 
(Exs. 18, 19) The letters were dated July 25 and July 27, 
1973. Mrs. Ross inexplicably did not remember receiving 
said letters. (T. 134) The substance of the contact is 
set forth in the last paragraph of said letters: 
Since it is Mr. Ross' desire to clear up 
his past, I am therefore sure you can 
understand the procedure he is following 
in this matter. (emphasis added) (Exs. 18, 19) 
There is no evidence that Mrs. Ross ever turned these 
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letters into welfare or took any action to report Mr. 
Ross at this point. 
Mr. Ross Makes Contact With Recovery Services 
Mr. Ross testified that he made contact with 
Recovery Services for the purpose of getting the matter 
of past and future child support and alimony straightened 
out. (T. 27-30, 161-4) He employed an attorney for this 
purpose. (T. 162 and Exs. 17, 18 and 19) The first two 
checks were paid to Recovery Services on August 4, 1973, 
and September 17, 1973. (Ex. 2 schedule B and Ex. 26, 
checks numbered 322 and 359) An agreement was eventually 
reached (the terms of which will be discussed below) (see 
Ex. 16) and the plaintiff began making payments directly 
to the Family Support clerk. (See Ex. 15) But again, 
defendant took no effort to press any collections of ar-
rearages allegedly due for child support and alimony. 
This is conduct consistent with the position 
that the parties had an understanding regarding arrearages: 
Mr. Ross would pay child support and Mrs. Ross would not 
press any arrearages. 
Christmas Visit Of 1975 
Both of the parties testified that the plaintiff 
visited the children in Salt Lake around Christmastime, 
197 5. (T. 139-40, 165-6) While here, Mr. Ross stayed 
with the defendant at her parents' home, and lived on the 
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same floor! (T. 46, 165-8, 141) Certainly, if the defen~ 
dant had wanted to "get" the plaintiff, she could have do~ 
it at that time easily. Thus, once again, her actions are 
more consistent with Mr. Ross' version of the facts: i.e. 
that the parties had an understanding that the back child 
support was relinquished. In fact, Mr. Ross testified 
that he was not at all concerned when he came to Salt Lake 
at this time, because he was current and the matter of the 
past child support had been resolved. (T. 165-6) 
Return To Salt Lake City Permanently 
Plaintiff testified that while living at defen-
dant's home during the Christmas season, 1975, they dis-
cussed reconciliation and Carol asked him to move to Salt 
Lake City and move in with her so that they could raise the 
children like a family again. (T. 167-8) Carol Ross denies 
this version of the story, claiming that they were never 
even alone (!!) during the entire three days. (T. 140) 
Plaintiff's version is obviously more credible since Carol 
sent plaintiff a list of car dealers for possible jobs 
shortly thereafter (T. 168, 46), and allowed plaintiff 
to move in with her in January, approximately one month 
later, and they began living together as man and wife. 
(T. 46, 168) 
Defendant could have easily had plaintiff taken 
into custody or served with an Order to Show Cause in the 
event that she was concerned with delinquent support and 
alimony payments. 
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The Parties' Reconciliation 
It is undisputed that the parties lived together 
as man and wife from either late January, or early Febru-
ary, through December, 1976, a period of approximately one 
year. Ironically, defendant claimed at trial that she 
was still mad about arrearages during this period, but 
never did anything: 
Q: Were you still mad about the fact 
that you hadn't received child sup-
port and alimony? (After Mr. Ross 
had moved back to Salt Lake and began 
living with her) 
A: Itdidn't make me happy. It was brought 
up. 
Q: It was brought up? And you said when 
you began living together, you still 
owe me child support and alimony; pay 
up as soon as you can, something to 
that effect? Was that it? 
A: No. (T. 143) 
Defendant later testified again that even after they began 
living together, she wasn't willing to make any conces-
sions: 
How can you forget something like that? 
There was a lot of debt. He owed me a 
lot of money. (T. 152) 
Despite this "anger", defendant never took any action to 
collect any of the money allegedly owed. Once again, this 
is much more consistent with plaintiff's version of the 
facts: there was an understanding regarding the waiver 
of past-due child support and alimony. 
The Second Separation 
In September, 1976, the parties purchased a 
$42,000 home, with plaintiff making a $5,000 downpayment. 
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(T. 144-5) The parties lived there together with their 
family until late December, 1976, or a period of approxi-
mately three months, at which time they split up again. 
(T. 170) Obviously, at the time that they split up for t~ 
second time, feelings toward each other could not have been 
the most favorable. Yet, once again, defendant took no 
action whatsoever to attempt to force the payment of any 
arrearages. This again is consistent with the theory of 
the arrangement between the parties. 
No Protest Or Demand Until Lawsuit Filed 
Probably the most convincing argument against 
the position taken by defendant and in favor of the es-
toppel claimed by plaintiff is the fact that defendant 
never took any action, made any demand, lodged any pro-
tests, or did any other act, to show her dissatisfaction 
with the arrangements alleged by plaintiff until plaintiff 
filed a lawsuit against her (T. 182) to recover the house 
in December, 1977. In defendant's own words: 
Q: (Mr. Sykes): So you never protested 
to anybody in 1973, 1974 or 1975, to 
anybody, did you? 
A: No. 
Q: Ever? 
A: No. 
Q: You never made any objection to anybody? 
A: No. (T. 134-5) 
In fact, if defendant's own testimony is to be believed, 
she never even had a conversation (much less, a protest) 
with plaintiff himself until they began living together 
again in January, 1976. (T. 152) 
-24-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~nlikely Reasons for Non-Protest 
Although she began receiving $225 per month 
around August or September, 1973, defendant never protested 
to anybody about the past-due support orthe fact that it 
wasn't what the Court had originally ordered. In her own 
words, she felt that it would be a "hopeless" act (T. 134-
5) because: the plaintiff was unreliable when he made 
arrangements (T. 129, 71); and she usually got "nothing" 
whenever he promised to send her something. (T. 71) 
This statement is hard to square with the fact 
that once plaintiff at least thought he had an agreement, 
he began paying regular monthly payments and never failed 
to make the amount due for 30 months, from August, 1973, 
through January, 1976, when the parties moved in together. 
(Ex. 15) Furthermore, he made every house payment without 
fail from September, 1976, through December, 1977. (T. 144-
5 I 170) 
Either Representations 
(An Understanding) Or Conduct Justifying Reliance 
Once again, defendant's version of the alleged 
unreliability does not square with the actual facts. 
Plaintiff's regular, responsible payments of the "agreed" 
child support amounts, plus payments of the house payments 
which gave defendant and the family a free place to live for 
sixteen months, combined with defendant's lack of protest 
for nearly 80 months, by her own admission, force the in-
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escapable conclusion that there was an implicit agreement 
or understanding between the parties that past-due child 
support and alimony was waived or released. If there was 
no implicit agreement, there is certainly conduct which 
lulled plaintiff into failing to make payments or seeking 
modification. (T. 169) 
Defendant should thus be estopped from claiming 
arrearages in this action. 
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c 
DEFENDANT HAD AN ACTUAL, EXPRESS 
AGREEMENT WITH RECOVERY SERVICES, 
ACTING ON DEFENDANT'S BEHALF 
Initial Contact With Recovery Services 
Plaintiff testified that he got somewhat nervous 
about making payments directly to defendant, because he 
didn't think it was right that she also be on welfare at 
the same time. (T. 27-8) He thus contacted his lawyer 
in Dallas, whose efforts eventually led to plaintiff making 
direct payments of $234 each in the months of August and 
September, 1973. (T. 27-8, 162 and Exs. 17-19) 
Meanwhile, the efforts of Mr. Zambos to find 
the plaintiff were independently coming to fruition and 
he did locate the address of Mr. Ross in late September, 
1973. (T. 108) This apparently led to the telephone call 
in which the two talked on October 2, 1973 (T. 109), and 
led to Mr. Zambos' letter to Mr. Ross of October 4, 1973. 
(Ex. 16) 
The "Assignment of Collection Of Support Payments" 
On October, 1972, defendant applied for welfare 
(T. 75) and executed the "assignment" which reads in 
pertinent part as follows: 
... I, Carol D. Ross, hereby assign, 
transfer and set over to the Utah 
State Division of Family Services ... 
all monies payable to me and/or my 
child from Richard M. Ross ... and also 
past support and alimony due me ... 
(I] further authorize said assignee 
to do every act and thing it deems 
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necessary to collect the support 
and/or alimony payments, including 
any and all legal action it deems 
necessary or the compromising of 
my or our claims without further 
notice to me. (emphasis added) (Ex. 4) 
This document clothed the Department of Social Services 
with the express authority to inter alia waive or compro-
mise any claim for arrearages in child support and alimony. 
This is so because in the first paragraph, a claim for 
"past support and alimony due me" is recognized. In the 
second paragraph of Exhibit 4, the express authority is 
given for the "compromising of my or our claims". 
This compromise provision makes good sense and 
good public policy: it may often be necessary to compro-
mise all arrearages of both support and alimony in order 
to get a repentant, but non-wealthy father to begin paying 
in the here and now and ease the State of a welfare burden. 
The past due portion is generally impossible to collect 
anyway. 
This assignment cannot be so narrowly con-
strued as to only grant the authority to waive or compro-
mise the State's portion of money collected (for past wel-
fare payments made) , since it is couched in the language 
of "compromising of my or our claims". "Claims" means 
the whole sum of the arrearage could be given up al-
though the State would only be partially subrogated (to 
the extent of welfare payments). 
There are absolutely no relevant limitations on 
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tl1" '"uthority granted to the Department of Social Services 
in this assignment regarding the compromising of arrearages 
in child support. 
Mr. Ross' Contact With Mr. Zambos 
The contact between plaintiff and Mr. Zambos 
of the Department of Social Services has been set forth 
above in detail. (T. 161-5) Mr. Ross testified that he 
initiated the contact with Recovery Services through his 
attorney (T. 162); that he subsequently made a direct tele-
phone call to Recovery Services and talked to someone 
who's name he couldn't remember (T. 162); and thereafter 
received a letter from that person. (T. 162-3, Ex. 16) 
He further testified with respect to arrearages as fol-
lows: 
Q: What did he (Zambos) tell you with 
respect to what it meant to make 
those payments that you were making, 
the $225 a month? 
A: That I would be current, caught up. 
And, you know, just continue to pay 
it and I would be, you know, out of 
trouble. 
Q: Did Mr. Zambos say with respect--
or was there any conversation at all, 
any mention of the past-due payments 
that the welfare department had paid? 
A: I had asked if I owed anything from 
what I already paid her, and he said, 
"No 11 • 
Q: That was it? 
A: Yeah. Otherwise, I could make payments. 
Q: Did he say anything about the amounts 
accrued prior to the time she went on 
welfare? 
A: No. Q: But did he say if you make payments in 
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the future, that was all you have to 
make? 
A: Right. (T. 164) 
Q: Do you recall any conversation from 
that point on, that totally into 
the future $225 would be the only 
obligation? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you have any independent re-
collection of statements made to 
you to that effect? 
A: I asked them about it. I talked to 
them about if I owed them for any 
back payments or what the deal was, 
how do we work this out. He said 
get caught up from now and pay con-
tinually and everything will be 
fine. I was under the impression 
that if I stayed in Dallas, or any-
where else in the world, that as long 
as I paid this $225, everything was 
taken care of. (T. 30-1) 
From this somewhat disjointed testimony, the conclusion 
is clear that Mr. Ross is claiming an oral agreement with 
Mr. Zarnbos on behalf of Mrs. Ross that plaintiff need not 
pay arrearages. It is only logical that this would have 
been on his mind since his previously stated purpose, in 
defendant's own words, was to "make some arrangements 
for it (child support)". (T. 63, 27-31, 162) 
Mr. Zarnbos' Confirmatory Letter Of 
10-4-73 (Ex. 16) 
Mr. Ross was justified in the belief that he 
had made an agreement with Recovery Services on behalf 
of defendant to release the arrearages by virtue of the 
letter of 10-4-73. That letter (Ex. 16) reaffirmed the 
telephone conversation that apparently occurred between 
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Zambos and Mr. Ross on October 2, 1973. The letter 
clearly stated: 
... you agreed to pay $75 a month 
child support for each child; totaling 
$225, effective September 1, 1973; 
furthermore, you agreed to double up 
on your payments to bring your account 
current by October 31, 1973. (Ex. 16) 
Thus, Mr. Zarnbos twice used the word "agreed" 
signifying some type of permanent arrangement, which must 
have reference to the words "double up ... to bring your 
account current ... " Thus Mr. Ross was fully justified in 
believing, as he testified, that his account truly would 
be "current", or that he would owe nothing further if 
he was to maintain the "agreed" payments. 
This is fully consistent with the written, 
express grant of authority given to Mr. Zambos in Exhibit 
4 wherein he (an agent of the Department of Social Services) 
was fully authorized " ... to do every act and thing .. 
necessary or the compromising of my or our claims .. 
(as to "past support and alimony due me"). (Ex. 4) 
No Independent Recollection 
It was not surprising at trial that Mr. Zambos 
had no independent recollection of the telephone calls 
or facts surrounding the case of Richard Ross (aka Hender-
son) or Carol Ross. Nor did his file refresh his memory. 
(T. 98-9, 114-5) He did, however, confirm that his signature 
appeared on the letter of 10-4-73 (Ex. 16). (T. 109) He 
also confirmed what was obvious from the letter: 
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Q: (Mr. Sykes) : I notice in this 
first paragraph you use the term-
inology "at which time you agreed 
to pay $75 a month." Then down 
in the fourth line you say, 
"Furthermore", I am quoting again 
from your letter, first paragraph, 
"you agreed to double up on your 
payments." When you used that 
terminology "agreed" were you re-
ferring to some arrangement between 
yourself and Mr. Ross? 
A: Yes. (T. llO) 
Thus, Mr. Zambos made an agreement with Mr. Ross. 
Attempts To Limit Zambos' Authority 
Ineffectual--Legal Error Committed By The Court 
Despite his lack of independent or refreshed 
recollection, Mr. Zambos attempted to "explain" the 
unwritten meaning of Exhibit 16 on cross-examination by 
his attorney. This sequence appears in the transcript on 
pages 114-117, and 120-121. The substance of his testi-
many was as follows: 
a. That the letter of 10-4-73 was not 
meant to affect the California di-
vorce decree (where Mr. Ross was to 
pay $450 per month not $225). (T. 
116, lns. 10, 11) 
b. That Ross was to begin paying $450 
a month at the end of October. 
(T. 116 , lns. 1 7, 18) 
c. That it was not meant to affect 
alimony. (T. 116, lns. 23-5) 
d. That his "general practice" was 
never to enter into an agrement 
where a father would pay less than 
the divorce decree provided. (T. 117, 
lns. 3-5, 8-9) 
e. That there is some type of "general 
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procedure" as to compromise where 
arrearages would not be reduced. 
(T. 120, lns. 23-30; 121, lns. 1-10) 
All of the above testimony was objected to by 
plaintiff's counsel, and overruled. Error was committed 
for the following reasons: 
a. It is totally irrelevant and im-
material to the legal affect of 
Exhibits 4 and 16 in this case as 
to what Mr. Zambos may have done in 
other cases for Recovery Services 
in the past. (T. lJ.5, lns. 7, 8) 
Mr. Zambos' answer should have been 
stricken in that regard. 
b. Mr. Zambos' counsel attempted to lead 
him into an improper statement by in-
timating that Exhibit 16 "refreshed" 
his memory, when Zambos had previously 
testified that he had no independent 
recollection of any of the events on 
several occasions. (T. 115, lns. 21-30) 
c. The Court allowed Mr. Zambos to testify 
about what the contents of the letter 
of October 4, 1973, "means or meant to 
you at the time". (T. 116, lns. 6-18) 
The witness had already testified that 
he had no independent recollection and 
thus the question was without foundation 
and the answer should have been stricken. 
d. The same argument applies to Mr. Williams' 
questions about alimony payments in the 
letter of 10-4-73 and the way that Mr. 
Zambos handles it as a "general principle". 
(T. 116, lns. 29-30; 117, lns. 1, 2) 
e. The Judge next allowed defense counsel to 
ask a leading question that was also 
without foundation about the general prac-
tice which would allegedly not permit 
Recovery Services to reduce any Court 
order. (T. 116, lns. 3-9) In addition, 
it called for a legal conclusion which 
Mr. Zambos was not qualified to make, i.e. 
what types of prior agreements between 
parties would or would not enable the 
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parties to pay less than the di-
vorce decree specified. He cannot 
possibly be competent on that subject. 
f. Once again, Mr. Zambos was asked questions 
about compromise and what the procedure 
has been as to the amounts to compromise. 
(T. 120, lns. 23-26) There were no 
foundational questions asked as to where 
he derived an understanding of the "pro-
cedure". 
In general, Mr. Zambos' testimony was highly speculative 
as to what might have happened or what could have happened. 
(T. 123) It should have been excluded and it constitutes 
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider it. 
Zambos' Explanations Have No Legal Basis 
The attempts of both the other attorneys and ~tr. 
Zambos to downplay the importance of the letter of 10-4-73 
• 
and the assignment, as well as trying to limit the authoriti 
or agency of Mr. Zambos, have no basis in law or fact. It 
is not at all important what Mr. Zambos subjectively thinks 
about his authority to compromise claims for past-due 
support. His actual authority is what counts. His actual 
authority is implied (in law) from words, conduct of the 
parties, and facts and circumstances surrounding the case. 
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P. 2d 862 (Utah 1978). Thus, the 
agent's own understanding, or misunderstanding, of the 
scope of his agency is totally useless. The facts and 
written documentation surrounding this case clearly show 
the existence of the agency on the part of the Department 
of Recovery Services to compromise claims for arrearage. 
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Carol Ross Ratified The Reduction 
Of Amounts Allegedly Owed 
At one point, defendant Carol Ross under exam-
ination by her own attorney attempted to show that she 
never made any concessions as to back child support or 
alimony. (T. 152, lns. 18-22) However, defendant admitted: 
a. That she executed the assignment. (Ex. 4) 
b. That Recovery Services was working to 
obtain child support payments for her 
(T. 131-2), as her agent. 
c. That from approximately August, 1973, 
through January, 1976, Recovery Services 
collected $225 per month, on the average, 
from plaintiff on her behalf. (Ex. 15) 
d. That the plaintiff was acting in reliance 
upon said procedure in making payments 
to the Family Support Divison. (Ex. 16) 
e. That she took no steps to modify any 
arrangement whereby she was receiving 
support payments, or indicate dis-
satisfaction with the procedure. (T. 134-5) 
The Courts have always held that the alleged unauthorized 
agency or act of the agent may be ratified when aff irmance 
is accompanied by knowledge of the material facts. Where 
this is the case, a party will be estopped to deny the 
agency or authority of the agent. Fuqua Homes Inc. v. 
Grosvenor, 569 P. 2d 854 (Ariz. 1977) 
It is clear that defendant and the State must 
be estopped from denying the agency of Mr. Zambos in 
recovering less than the amount that she was allegedly 
due under the California decree. Findings of Fact Nos. 
7, 8 and 9 are in error and the decision must be reversed. 
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D 
MR. ROSS HAS BEEN LULLED INTO 
FAILURE TO MAKE CHILD SUPPORT 
AND ALIMONY PAYMENTS AND IT 
WOULD CAUSE HIM GREAT HARDSHIP 
AND INJUSTICE IF MRS. ROSS WERE 
NOW ALLOWED TO ENFORCE THE PAY-
MENT OF SUCH BACK INSTALLMENTS 
The Larsen Standard 
A plaintiff seeking to establish estoppel must 
show that the mother's actions lulled him into failing to 
make the payments and into changing his position, which he 
would not have done but for the representations or the 
actions of the mother. Furthermore, it must be shown that 
great hardship and injustice would result if the mother 
was allowed to enforce the payment of back installments. 
Larsen, supra. 
Detrimental Change of Position 
Mr. Ross testified on several occasions about 
his detrimental change of position. (T. 20-1, 23-4, 169-
70, 151; see also Answers to Supplemental Interrogatories, 
No. 4, R. l 0 l) 
Failure to Seek Modification 
Of Divorce Decree 
Probably the most important single detriment 
to plaintiff sustained in reliance upon the implicit agree-
ment or conduct of defendant was his failure to seek modi-
fication of the February, 1971, divorce decree. Defendant 
admitted that she made a substantial amount of money on 
the sale of the house in California (T. 215) in approxi-
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m0tccly August, 1972, and that she became employed with 
Salt Lake County in approximately July or August, 1973. 
Either of these changes in circumstance would have arguably 
been grounds for a modification of the 1971 decree. 
Plaintiff had a lawyer in Dallas, with whom 
he obviously discussed the entire matter of modification. 
(T. 169, Exs. 17, 18 and 19) In fact, plaintiff testified 
as follows: 
Q: Going back to 1973 just for a 
moment, did you ever consider 
filing an action to modify the 
decree during 1973? 
A: I didn't think I needed to. I 
thought when I talked with Re-
covery Services that we had that 
all arranged. I just assumed, 
you know, everything was taken 
care of at this point. (T. 169) 
Coming To Salt Lake In January, 1976 
Plaintiff came to Salt Lake City around Christmas-
time, 1975, to visit the children. Plaintiff claims that 
defendant asked him at that time to return to Salt Lake 
and live with her and the children as a family. (T. 167-8) 
Defendant denies that she made this request at Christmastime 
~ 140), but the facts speak for themselves. Plaintiff re-
turned to Salt Lake City permanently in January, 1976, 
and moved right in with defendant, sharing the same floor 
in the home of defendant's parents. (T. 141-2) Plaintiff 
claims that they began living together as man and wife almost 
immediately, while defendant claims that it wasn't for at 
least a month. (T. 169, 142) 
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As a result of the move to Salt Lake City, 
plaintiff testified that he sustained the following 
specific detriments: 
a. He quit his job in Dallas (T. 169) 
wherein he earned approximately 
$16,637 in 1975. (T. 183, Ex. 36) 
(Mr. Ross explained why his 1975 
tax return did not accurately 
reflect his income due to an error) . 
(T. 183-4) 
b. He took a lower paying job in Salt 
Lake. (Ex. 11; T. 23, 169) 
c. He had to rent a trailer to haul 
his belongings to Salt Lake. (T. 169) 
d. He had to get a friend to drive one 
of his cars up to Salt Lake, presumably 
pay his expenses on the road, and buy 
a one-way ticket back to Dallas for him. 
(T. 169) 
e. He had to sell a boat and trailer that 
he couldn't bring to Salt Lake. (T. 169) 
f. He moved away from many of his friends. 
(T. 20-1) 
g. He (with the defendant) purchased a house 
and paid most of the downpayment of 
$5, 000 in September, 197 6. (T. 24, 169-70) 
The house is now encumbered in ways that 
have led to this lawsuit since the parties 
are listed as husband and wife and owners 
in "joint tenancy". (Exs. 32, 33 and 34) 
h. Plaintiff paid a personal judgment of 
of the defendant's. (T. 151 and Ex. 14) 
Not insignificantly, it should be emphasized 
that at no time did plaintiff ever again seek to file a 
modification of the action until December, 1977, when defen 
dant refused to leave the home. (T. 182) By this time, 
thousands of dollars in "arrearages" had accrued. 
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Purchase Of The House As A Detriment 
It is particularly significant, as a detriment 
to plaintiff, that he purchased the house at l084 Grambling 
Way. He testified that he purchased said home with the 
defendant as a joint tenant and as "husband and wife" in 
September, 1976, with a downpayment of $5,000 that was 
almost entirely his. (T. 169-70, 144-5) Mr. Ross made 
all of the payments on the home. (T. l44) It was obviously 
his home, and his responsibility. He testified that he 
allowed her to live there, as per agreement when they split 
up in December, 1976, through June, 1977, so that the 
children could go to school. (T. 170) 
Beca:.use of the fact that both of their names 
were legally on the purchase documents for the house, 
friction developed between the parties, with the defendant 
refusing to remove her name from the house although she 
had made no payments whatsoever on it and really had no 
valid ownership interest therein. Plaintiff's filing 
of the quiet title and modification action (T. 182) 
prompted defendant to file a counterclaim for arrearages 
which led to the judgment in this action. 
This has caused plaintiff many thousands of dol-
lars in attorney's fees as well as forced sale of the home 
and the holding of the money in escrow pending the outcome 
of this action. (R. 238-242) None of this would have 
happened if plaintiff had not justifiably relied on the 
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fact that he thought he had an agreement, and thus taken 
no action to secure modification or redress for six to 
seven years. 
-40-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
E 
THE DEFENDANT-MOTHER MAY BE 
ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THE 
RIGHT TO RECEIVE REIMBURSE-
MENT FOR SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
WHEN SAID SUPPORT HAS ALREADY 
BEEN PAID 
The Legal Standard 
When dealing with arrearages for child support 
(as opposed to future payments due), the mother has the 
right to make a decision releasing the claim for the 
amount due. In Larsen v. Larsen, the Court held: 
If the child has been the bene-
ficiary of equivalent support and 
education so that the mother is 
entitled to receive all of the past-
due support money, she should be 
free to release, compromise, or 
waive that which is hers. Larsen, 
supra at 598. 
This is especially true where the support 
awarded by the decree has been paid in full or in part 
by an out-of-court third party and not by the mother. 
In Wasescha v. Wasescha, supra, the Court held that there 
is no action for arrearages where the support has been 
satisfied by one not claiming reimbursement in Court. 
Wasescha, supra at 896. As the Court pointed out in 
Baggs v. Anderson, supra: 
This right of reimbursement belongs 
to whoever furnished the support; 
and it is subject to negotiation, 
settlement, satisfaction, or dis-
charge in the same manner as any 
other debt. Baggs, supra at 143. 
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Either Defendant Or Her· Parents 
Paid The Support 
Defendant claimed on several occasions that 
either she (T. 152) or her parents (T. 215) paid the 
support herein. If the support was paid by her parents, 
her counterclaim must fail since they are not a party 
to the action. If it was paid by herself, she has releas~ 
any right to reimbursement for arrearages for the reasons 
set forth above. 
F 
NO CONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED WHERE 
PARTIES CHANGE THE MONETARY TERMS 
OF A DIVORCE DECREE WITH RESPECT 
TO ARREARAGES 
This Court has held that the parties may make 
agreements changing the monetary terms of a divorce 
decree except where future child support is concerned, 
absent fraud, hardship, etc. Wallisv. Wallis, 9 Utah 
2d 237, 342 P. 2d 103 at 104 (1959). Because the validi~ 
of such an agreement rests upon equitable estoppel, 
laches, etc. and because estoppel sounds in equity, and 
not in law, legal consideration is not required. 28 AmJur 
2d, Estoppel and Waiver, §30, p. 634. 
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POINT II 
THE FATHER MAY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUM-
STANCES MAKE CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 
PAYMENTS IN SOME MANNER OTHER THAN 
AS DECREED BY THE COURT; IN ANY EVENT, 
THE COURT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS 
EQUITABLE DISCRETION IN THIS CASE 
SHOULD CREDIT THE FATHER WITH SUCH 
PAYMENTS AND FIND SUBSTANTIAL COM-
PLIANCE WITH THE DECREE. 
A 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT PLAINTIFF HAD MADE CHILD 
SUPPORT PAYMENTS TO THE DEFEN-
DANT IN ONLY THE SUM OF $7,024 
(FINDING OF FACT NO. 3). THE 
COURT ALSO COMMITTED ERROR IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
IS INDEBTED TO THE DEFENDANT 
IN THE SUM OF $16,082 FOR AC-
CRUED, UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND 
$7,675 FOR ACCRUED, UNPAID ALI-
MONY. (CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS. 
4, 6, and 7) 
The Applicable Law 
The proposition that a father may not unilaterally 
decide when, where and how to pay child support and alimony 
requires no citation. This Court has often held that, as a 
general rule, alimony and support payments must be made to 
the mother and that the decree fixing the obligations of 
th2 parties cannot be modified or changed by the conduct of 
the parties. Stanton v. Stanto~, 10 Utah 2d 315, 517 P. 
2d 1010 at 1Cl3 (1974). However, equity declares certain 
exceptions. The Stanton Court noted that the rule that 
a father may not· "unilaterally" decide that he will not pay 
support and offset it by favors to the children may be 
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modified at times because; 
••. in matters concerning the 
custody and support of children, 
because of their highly equitable 
nature, it is appropriate for the 
trial court to take into consideration 
the entire circumstances in making 
any order of enforcement of the de-
cree, by contempt, or otherwise, 
having in mind his equitable powers 
to make any adjustment he may think 
fair and justified. 517 P. 2d at 
1013-4. 
This exception would apply all the more where the adjust-
ments made by the father are not "unilateral", but con-
sented to by the mother, as in the case at the bar. 
Another Court has stated that although the 
husband cannot normally make payments directly to the 
children, special considerations of an equitable nature can 
justify the Court in crediting such payments on indebtednes£ 
to the wife when it can be done without injustice to her. 
Briggs v. Briggs, 165 P. 2d 772 (Ore. 1946) 
Plaintiff Entitled To 
Greater Credit On Payment Of Support 
This case is not one where the father has simply 
refused to make any payments over a long period of time, 
totally ignoring the needs of his family. The Court abused 
its discretion in failing to consider this factor. 
The Plaintiff and his mother both testified that 
plaintiff called his mother within a few days of when he 
left California in 1971, inquired about the welfare of the 
children, and shortly thereafter began sending $200 to $250 
per month to be used for their support. (T. 10-14; 83-90) 
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,Le.~ ··1cKendrick testified that every dime of that money was 
used for the support of the children. (T. 90) This would 
have amounted to a total of approximately $4,350. 
Schedule A; Ex. 21, IA and IV) 
(Ex. 2, 
Additionally, plaintiff produced cancelled checks 
at the trial for $2,609, which represented money used for 
the support of the children during 1976-1977, primarily 
dental expenses, clothing, etc. (Ex. 2, Schedule E; Ex. 21, 
IE; Ex. 28; T. 155-7) (Defendant did claim that these 
were paid out of a joint checking account, however. (T. 147)) 
In addition to expenses that can be segregated 
just for the children, plaintiff paid the amounts shown on 
Exhibit 2, Schedules C and F (also summarized on Exhibit 21) 
which represent general support provided for family expenses 
during the time the parties were together. (T. 155-7) 
Schedule G of Exhibit 2, with the exception of the down-
payrnent on the house, also represents expenses that are 
directly beneficial to the children and the family. 
The parties also stipulated that if plaintiff were 
to testify, he would affirm that all of the expenses set 
forth in Exhibit 21 are amounts which should fairly be con-
sidered child support, with the exception of Schedule B 
(Ex. 27) which should be considered payment of alimony. 
(T. 155-6) 
Altogether, in the event that this Court does not 
reverse the trial court on the basis of the argument set 
forth in POINT I, this Court should reverse at least to the 
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.. 
extent of decreeing that the amounts set forth in plaintifi 
Exhibit 21, totalling $28,003.09, should be credited tot~ 
account of the plaintiff for the following reasons: 
a. The equitable circumstances of this 
case, recited above at length, require 
such findings. 
b. The clear preponderance of the evidence, 
as recited above, compels the finding 
that all of said amounts were paid by 
plaintiff and intended by him to be 
payment of support obligations; and 
were accepted by the defendant as sub-
stituted of equal consideration for 
the support obligations. 
As an example of the latter, see Exhibit 21, II, wherein 
house·payments totaling $5,840 were made by plaintiff, thus 
providing defendant and the family with housing at no charg' 
for over a year. 
B 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RE-
FUSING TO ABATE THE ALIMONY 
AND CHILD SUPPORT FOUND OWING 
FOR THE TIME THAT THE PARTIES 
LIVED TOGETHER DURING A RECON-
CILIATION ATTEMPT 
The Legal Standard 
Counsel has found no Utah case specifically on 
point regarding this issue, but it has often been dealt w~ 
by other courts. In the case of In Re Peterson, 57 2 P. 2d 
849 (Colo. App. 1977), the parties were divorced in November 
1974. From January through September, 1975, the parties 
lived together with the children in the hope of effecting a 
reconciliation, as in the case at the bar. After the father 
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, •d out, the mother claimed arrear ages for chilC! support 
and alimony. In upholding a ruling adverse to the mother, 
the intermediate Colorado Appellate Court held: 
... Under the circumstances of this 
case, where the parties made a good 
faith, although unsuccessful attempt 
at reconciliation, and where the hus-
band supported the family at this time, 
we agree with the trial court that the 
support paid and contributed by the 
husband constituted payment of the in-
stallments accruing during the period 
that they were living together. This 
conforms to the public policy in the 
state "to promote and foster the mar-
riage relationship and reconciliation 
of estranged spouses." (citation ommitted) 
572 P. 2d at 851. 
This policy should be adopted in the State of Utah. 
The Parties' Reconciliation 
The parties lived together in a reconciliation 
attempt from January through December, 1976. (T. 168, 144-5) 
In a sense, the reconciliation attempt continued even after 
plaintiff moved out of the house in December, 1976, since 
he allowed defendant to remain in the home; continued to 
provide considerable support; and even delivered a car to 
his wife to drive six months after he moved. (T. 195, 206, 
217) 
In any event, this Court should reduce the amount 
for which judgment was granted by the sum of at least $450 
per month for each of the months in which the parties 
actually lived together, or from February through December, 
1976, or a period of eleven months. That would result in a 
reduction of $4,950. 
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POINT III 
THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE 
IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE FINANCIAL 
CONDITION OF THE DEFENDANT, AS WELL 
AS IN OTHER REGARDS, WHICH JUSTIFIED 
THE COURT IN REDUCING THE ALIMONY 
AWARD TO 0 AND THE CHILD SUPPORT TO 
$75 PER MONTH PER CHILD.5 
A 
DEFENDANT'S CIRCUMSTANCES HAD 
SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED FOR THE 
BETTER JUSTIFYING A DECREASE 
IN ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
The Legal Standard 
This Court has always held that divorce decrees 
may be modified only upon the showing of a substantial 
change in circumstances. Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 
198 p. 2d 233 (1948) . 
Plaintiff's Circumstances 
Basically Unchanged 
Plaintiff testified that although he was unemploy 
for a certain part of 1971, his earning rate was approxi-
mately $1,000 per month while working. Thus, had he been 
employed for the entire year, he would have made approxirnat 
$12,000. (T. 197, 190) He also testified that his income 
SAlthough the Court ruled in favor of plaintiff on 
the issue of modification, and plaintiff makes no appeal in 
this regard, the argument in opposition to defendant's appe' 
on this point will be enclosed in this brief in POINT III 
in order to save the necessity of filing a reply brief, and 
to conserve the time of the Court in this matter. 
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dt l hr time of the trial was approximately $1, 200 per, month 
(T. 191), and that his living expenses were approximately 
$1,110 to $1,167 per month. 
It is clear that there is no 3ubstantial change 
in plaintiff's circumstances which would justify an increase 
in child support, or further payment of alimony. 
Defendant's Circumstances 
Defendant testified that at the time of the di-
vorce hearing in California, she was not employed at all and 
had no other income from any source other than her father. 
(T. 208) 
Defendant became employed in approximately May of 
1973. (R. 146) Her payroll stubs for November, 1977, 
indicated that as of the end of that month, she had made 
approximately $8,096, and that by the end of the year she 
would make $9,000 for that year. (T. 209-10) In addition, 
and more importantly, her recent payroll stub for the 
period ending 2/28/78 showed that as of that date, for 
approximately 1/6 of the year, she had earned the sum of 
$2,404. This would project a yearly income of approximately 
$15,004. (T. 226) This is a substantial change for 
defendant. (T. 224, 226) 
When viewed as a whole, there is little question 
that the facts and circumstances surrounding this case 
justify the Court's finding that alimony should be reduced 
to zero and child support should be reduced to $75 per 
month per child. 
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CONCLUSION 
This is basically a case where actions speak 
louder than words. Plaintiff believes that the facts of 
this case, when viewed objectively, show the following: 
a. Plaintiff made a mistake by leaving 
California and in a sense abandoning 
the family, but even so made some 
effort to support his children by 
payment of approximately $200 to $250 
per month to his mother, who purchased 
clothing and food for the family. 
b. The Plaintiff attempted to rectify 
his past mistakes by contacting the 
defendant, and paying her some money 
directly. 
c. He further attempted to rectify his 
mistake by contacting Recovery Services 
and getting his "name straight" and 
arriving at an agreement as to what he 
could afford to pay. 
d. Defendant, by her explicit or implicit 
representations, as well as by her 
conduct, should be estopped from 
claiming any arrearages of either child 
support or alimony. 
e. Recovery Services, acting as defen-
dant's agent, made an explicit agreement 
with the plaintiff, whereby defendant 
should also be estopped from claiming 
the arrearages. 
f. The facts and circumstances as well 
as the conduct of the defendant during 
the entire period justify estopping her 
from claiming any arrearages in child sup-
port and alimony for the main reason 
that she failed to take any action what-
soever to collect said arrearages despite 
numerous opportunities. This conduct 
supports plaintiff's version of the facts. 
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y. The plaintiff reasonably relied upon 
the conduct and/or representations of 
the defendant and her agent, Recovery 
Services, and subsequently suffered 
great detriment, financial and otherwise. 
In addition, plaintiff is entitled to a reduction 
in the judgment of amounts paid generally for support, even 
though they were not paid directly to the mother. Plaintiff 
is also entitled to an abatement on the child support and 
alimony during the times that the parties were reconciled 
and living together. 
All of the facts and circumstances support a 
finding of substantially changed circumstances, justifying 
the modification of the California decree, as effected 
by the trial court. 
R;e;t2t?~ 
Robert B. Sykes ~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff--Appellant 
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